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upon any more than Congressional clarification. Accordingly,
lawyers and judges must live with the situation as it stands.
The most probable and under the circumstances the most reason-
able approach is that taken by Levitt and the previous decisions under
the act. That approach is to adopt the law of the state in its entirety,
except where the requirement for demand on shareholders or other
conditions precedent to bringing of the derivative suit so seriously
and unreasonably burden the shareholder as to prevent him from
bringing an otherwise bona fide suit under the act.
Following this rationale, Levitt will probably have very little
effect outside of Massachusetts, but it will have a substantial effect
in Massachusetts, the home of many investment companies. The
effect will be to make the Investment Company Act available to
shareholders who wish to attempt to enforce its provisions against
directors without having to make a demand on the multitude of
shareholders who are generally not interested in the internal opera-
tion of the company.
WILLIAM H. CANNON
Procedural Rules-Emergency--Judge's Discretion
The recent case of Application of President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc.' tests the powers of a judge to violate
usual procedural rules in an emergency situation. A patient, who had
voluntarily submitted herself for treatment at Georgetown Hospital,
refused to authorize blood transfusions which the doctors believed
necessary to save her life. After the patient's husband had also re-
fused to authorize the transfusions, the hospital's attorneys pre-
sented to a federal district judge an order authorizing transfusions
"necessary to save her life,"2 and requested him to sign it. The
judge denied the order without comment, and the attorneys then
orally petitioned a single judge of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, Judge Skelly Wright, in chambers to sign the order.
Judge Wright went to the hospital, talked with the patient and her
husband, and discovered them adamant in their conviction that blood
transfusions amount to "drinking blood," a practice strongly con-
dened by their religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses. He advised
the patient's husband to obtain counsel, but after making a telephone
1331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
2 Id. at 1001 n.1.
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call, the husband informed Judge Wright that he had discussed the
matter with his church and had decided he did not want counsel.
Judge Wright then, in the presence of members of the hospital staff,
the hospital's counsel, and the patient's husband, signed the order
just one hour and twenty minutes after it had been first presented
to him. The transfusions were administered, and the patient there-
after recovered and left the hospital.
Judge Wright's action was affirmed by the court en banc with-
out explanation in a per curiam decision,' accompanied by four
concurring and dissenting opinions.4
While this case raises a multitude of questions, both constitu-
tional5 and procedural,6 the scope of this note is confined to the
questions of whether the basic rules of procedure were violated in
this case and, if so, whether the violations were justified by the
emergency situation. For present purposes it is assumed that Judge
Wright had authority to act as a judge of original jurisdiction in
this matter.
Judge Wright's action can be attacked on the grounds that no
complaint was filed, 7 so that no action was commenced under Federal
Rule 3,3 and the jurisdiction of the court therefore never invoked.9
Judge Wright treated the order itself as sufficient, since it sub-
stantively met all the requirements of a complaint, particularly in
view of the fact that under Federal Rule 5 (e) "the judge may per-
'Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
'Judge Washington concurred on grounds that the order had expired by
its own terms and was therefore moot. Ibid. Judge Danaher "would dismiss
for lack of a case or controversy." Id. at 1011. Judge Miller, strongly dis-
senting, argued that the jurisdiction of the district court had never been
invoked since there had been no complaint as required by Federal Rule 3,
so that an appellate judge could not act, there being nothing to appeal from
the district court. He further maintained that a single judge had no authority
to hear an appeal. Ibid. Judge Berger asserted that the petition should be
dismissed on grounds that there was no justiciable controversy, since the
hospital had no standing to sue. Id. at 1015.
' For discussions of constitutional questions, see Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
706 (1964); Comment, 9 UTAH L. REv. 161 (1964).
'For a discussion of the validity of Judge Wright's actions in his capacity
as a single appellate judge, see Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1539 (1964).
'Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
8 "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
o Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
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mit the papers to be filed with him"'1 rather than with the clerk.
This argument is supported by the general proposition that a plead-
ing shall be construed by its contents rather than by its caption.,
Judge Wright alternatively asserted that "the lack of a com-
plaint is not jurisdictional and . . .when there has been no timely
objection, a valid judgment may properly be entered in such an in-
formal litigation."' 2 While there are cases in accord with this argu-
ment,"3 it should be observed that in each of these cases there was
either express waiver of the complaint by agreement of the parties,'
4
waiver by failure of the defendant to answer after he had been duly
served,' 5 or waiver by the defendant's failure to object to the form
of the complaint in his answer.' 6 There is no evidence that the
patient or her husband waived objection in Georgetown unless it can
be said that a general appearance was made.' 7 Some state cases have
held that a judgment is void without proper commencement of the
action by the filing of a complaint, even when the defendant appears
and argues the case on the merits,'8 or when the parties have ex-
pressly agreed to waive the pleadings.'0
But, even assuming that the order is acceptable as a complaint
or that the lack of a complaint can be waived, there was no service
1 Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000, 1001 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964), quoting from FED. R. Civ. P.
5(e). For a case applying the rule, see Robinson v. Waterman S.S. Co.,
7 F.R.D. 51 (D.N.J. 1947), aff'd on rehearing. 8 F.R.D. 155 (D.N.J. 1948).
"E.g., Harris v. Embrey, 105 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Russell v.
Bovard, 153 Kan. 729, 113 P.2d 1064 (1941); State ex rel. Gay v. District
Court of St. Louis County, 200 Minn. 207, 273 N.W. 701 (1937).
" Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000, 1001 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964), quoting 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 3.04, at 719 (2d ed. 1964).
1 Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957)
(applying the federal rules); Vider v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. App. 595,
aff'd, 164 Ill. 354, 45 N.E. 720 (1896); Leach v. Western North Carolina
R.R., 65 N.C. 486 (1871). Cf. Hall v. Law, 102 U.S. 461 (1880).
"Vider v. City of Chicago, supra note 13. See also N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 250 (1953).
' Leach v. Western North Carolina R.R., 65 N.C. 486 (1871).
10 Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.
1957).
1 See text accompanying notes 42-43 infra.
' Rhodes v. Sewell, 21 Ala. App. 441, 109 So. 179 (1926).
' New Haven Sand Blast Co. v. Dreisbach, 104 Conn. 322, 133 At. 99
(1926). See dictum in Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 283 (1876), which
states "the decree of a court of equity upon oral allegations, without written
pleadings, would be an idle act. .. "
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of process 20 upon the proper parties in this action, and indeed, it is
not clear who the proper parties are. However, assuming that the
hospital is a proper party to bring the action,2 ' then presumably the
patient would be the proper defendant, since only she, or her personal
representative, would have the right to bring an action against the
hospital for malpractice. 22 If so, the service requirement was clearly
violated, since the patient was neither served with process, nor did she
make an appearance at the "hearing. 21 3 However, Judge Wright
suggested that the patient was obviously incompetent at the time2 '
and thus seemed to assume her husband to be the proper party to the
action.
It is commonly accepted that a husband can, in an emergency and
when his wife is incapable of doing so, authorize medical treat-
ment for her.25 Whether he is, in such a situation, her guardian for
all purposes has apparently never been decided. Perhaps he can
be considered a proper "representative" under Federal Rule 17(c).26
20While under the Federal Rules filing of a complaint is the proper
manner of commencing an action (see note 8 supra), service of process
generally commences an action in the "code" states. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-14, -88 (1953). The Federal Rules require service of process to follow
the filing of the complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 5.
" Judge Wright contended that the hospital was a proper party to bring
a declaratory judgment action (he described the action as "in the nature
of an injunction and declaratory judgment," 331 F.2d at 1002), since it
faced possible civil and criminal liability if the patient died due to lack of
proper treatment. Id. at 1009. Judge Berger challenged this contention on
grounds that the patient and her husband consented to sign a release. 331
F.2d at 1015. Judge Wright argued that a release could not relieve the hos-
pital's criminal liability. 331 F.2d at 1009 n.18. Quaere: What criminal
liability could arise under these circumstances?
2"FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). A husband has no right of action against a
surgeon for malpractice against his wife. Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79
N.E. 562 (1906).
"Judge Wright termed the gathering of hospital officials, their attorneys,
and the patient's husband at which he signed the order a "hearing." 331
F.2d at 1002 n.4.
" There is a serious question as to whether a judge can decide incom-
petency without a hearing. See text accompanying notes 34-40 infra.
" However, it should be noted that the authority commonly given for
this statement, while implying a husband has such authority, expressly does
not decide the point. Pratt v. Davis, 224 IIl. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906). See
41 Am. JuR. Physician and Surgeons § 111 (1942).
"Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such
as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary,
the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incom-
petent person. If an infant orrincompetent person does not have a duly
appointed representative he may sue by his next friend or by a guardian
ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or
1965]
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It has been held that this rule does not make the appointment of a
guardian ad litem mandatory," if the incompetent person is ably
represented otherwise.2" However, failure to appoint a guardian
must be the result of the court's considering all the circumstances,
and, if such failure is merely an oversight of the judge,2 or if the
representation is inadequate, 30 then it is reversible error. The in-
terest of the court in all cases is whether or not the infant or incom-
petent is represented adequately at the trial.31 Hence, in Georgetown,
even though Judge Wright advised the patient's husband to secure
counsel and even though he presumably assumed the husband to be
his wife's representative, perhaps the fact that the patient's husband
did not obtain counsel invalidated a potentially valid representation
of the patient at the hearing. For, despite the opportunity the hus-
band was given, the fact that he did not avail himself of that oppor-
tunity resulted in the patient's interests not being adequately repre-
sented, thus defeating the primary purpose of the rule.32 Rule 17 (c)
apparently gives a court no authority over the incapacitated person,
other than in his capacity as a party.
3
3
Any standing the patient's husband may have as a party to the
action must be based upon the assumption that Judge Wright could,
on the basis of his brief encounter with the patient at the hospital,
declare her legally incompetent. The validity of such an assumption
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall
make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant
or incompetent person.
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
27Westcott v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 158 F.2d 20 (4th Cir.
1946).
" A representative may be considered sufficient, even though not duly
appointed by the court. Westcott v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra
note 27; Rutland v. Sikes, 203 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.S.C. 1962); Russick v.
Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949). See also Tart v. Register, 257
N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962).
"' Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958).
" Zaro v. Strauss, 167 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1948).
" See Narron v. Musgrave, 236 N.C. 388, 73 S.E.2d 6 (1952).
8We spell out the rule to mean: (1) as a matter of proper procedure,
the court should usually appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) but the Court
may, after weighing all the circumstances, issue such order as will pro-
tect the minor in lieu of appointment of a guardian ad litem; (3) and may
even decide that such appointment is unnecessary, though only after the
Court has considered the matter and made a judicial determination that
the infant is protected without a guardian.
Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958). (Emphasis
added.)88 In re Ryan, 47 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
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is very doubtful. Under the District of Columbia Code equity has
jurisdiction over insane persons,34 but this has been construed to
mean after an adjudication of insanity has been made.3" Such ad-
judication requires investigations by the Commission of Mental
Health,3 service upon the party to be adjudged,3 7 counsel for the
alleged incompetent person,38 and a jury trial if the alleged incom-
petent person demands it.39 Implicit in all these safeguards is the
idea that a person's freedom to make his own decisions is not to be
disposed of lightly.40
Even if the adjudication procedure could be modified in a proper
case and even if Judge Wright is deemed to have appointed the
husband as his wife's guardian by implication, the problem of lack
of service of process persists.4 The only alternative to service of
process is a general appearance before the court by the person to be
served. 2 It could be argued that the patient's husband did make a
general appearance in Georgetown on the grounds that he must have
known Judge Wright's action was to have some legal significance,
since he had been informed to obtain counsel, and that he was present
at the "hearing" when the order was signed. The fact that he may
not have known the legal effect of his appearance is not fatal, as
long as the appearance was made.4
Even though the rules of procedure have been circumvented in
Georgetown, perhaps an emergency situation requires some deviation
from the normal rules. The emergency aspect of Georgetown is
analogous to situations that permit a temporary restraining order to
3121 D.C. CODE ANN. § 301 (1961).
" Cooper v. Burton, 127 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1942).1821 D.C. CODE ANN. § 308 (1961).
'721 D.C. CODE ANN. § 311 (1961).
" Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"021 D.C. CODE ANN. § 312 (1961). For similar requirements under
state statute, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (Supp. 1963).
"See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). The Court held that a
judge could not, during a criminal trial, declare the defendant insane and
commit him to an asylum without his having pleaded insane or his having
been adjudged insane by normal procedures. But see Moore v. Lewis, 250
N.C. 77, 108 S.E.2d 26 (1959), where the court held that, in a case where a
guardian ad litem was appointed for a purpose other than that of representing
the incompetent at an insanity hearing, "an inquisition to determine the
sanity of the defendant is not a condition precedent to the appointment."
Id. at 80, 108 S.E.2d at 28.
" See note 20 supra.
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-103 (1958).
" Beardsley v. Beardsley, 144 Conn. 725, 137 A.2d 752 (1957).
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issue without service of process.4 4 Judge Wright indicated that he
considered the order he signed a temporary restraining order, 4' and,
certainly, the compelling reasons for waiver of process in the more
conventional temporary-restraining-order situation are present-ur-
gency, and an alternative result of irreparable injury. Moreover,
Judge Wright's primary rationale for signing the order was the
classic purpose of any preliminary injunction-"to maintain the
status quo and prevent the issue respecting the rights of the parties
in the premises from becoming moot before full consideration was
possible."4 However, the order did not, in fact, preserve the status
quo; rather, it "completely changed the status quo ante by granting
fully and finally all of the relief sought, thus disposing of the matter
on its merits,"4 7 and leaving nothing more to litigate.48 But because
of the exigency of the situation, the status quo in this case could not
be preserved by any action, or inaction, of Judge Wright. He was
faced with the alternative of either saving the patient's life, with the
result that she would be forever "contaminated" by the blood she had
received, or allowing her to die, with the result that there is nothing
to litigate except the hospital's possible liability for her death.40
"FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
"331 F.2d at 1003. Judge Wright calls his order a "temporary order,"
and cites Federal Rule 65(b).
" 331 F.2d at 1007. See 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.04-.05 (2d ed.
1964).
"' Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
" It is generally held that interlocutory injunctive relief will not be
given when the effect is to give plaintiff the relief he seeks without having a
trial. E.g., Kleins' Restaurant Corp. v. McLain, 293 Ill. App. 54, 11 N.E.2d
644 (1937) (where a temporary injunction against defendants' picketing
plaintiff's restaurant was set aside); Dallas Independent School Dist. v.
Daniel, 323 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (where a temporary restrain-
ing order reinstating a custodian who had been fired was held to be void).
"' Judge Wright's order is somewhat comparable to a preliminary manda-
tory injunction, and there are occasional dicta declaring that, in cases of ex-
treme hardship where plaintiff's right is clear and certain, a preliminary
mandatory injunction will issue, even though it in effect gives plaintiff all
the relief he seeks. Dunn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F.2d 873 (6th Cir.
1962); City of Decatur v. Meadors, 235 Ala. 544, 180 So. 550 (1938); Moss
Indus., Inc. v. Irving Metals Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 484, 55 A.2d 30 (Ch. 1947).
Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 213, 224 (1951). At least one case so holds. Texas
Pipe Line Co. v. Burton Drilling Co., 54 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
In that case, plaintiff was granted a temporary injunction ordering defendant
to carry plaintiff's oil through defendant's pipe line. The court stressed
defendant's public duty and the fact that defendant's hardship was trivial
when compared with plaintiff's hardship. In Georgetown the petitioners'
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An analogy can be made between Georgetown and the "sick
child" decisions " that have upheld orders for medical treatment for
minor children in emergency situations, despite the religious ob-
jections of the parents. This analogy is especially pertinent in view
of Judge Wright's assumption that the patient was "in extremis and
hardly compos inentis at the time," making it "the duty of a court
of general jurisdiction... to assume the responsibility of guardian-
ship for her, as for a child, at least to the extent of authorizing treat-
ment to save her life."'" The relevancy of the sick child cases is
diminished, however, by the strong probability that Judge Wright
did not have jurisdiction over the patient as an incompetent.52 All
of the sick child decisions seem to have been decided by authority of
some type of statutory grant of jurisdiction over "neglected" chil-
dren under the doctrine of parens patria.13 Only one case suggests
that a court has other than statutory jurisdiction under the parens
patria doctrine. 4
The sick child cases, if relevant at all, would seem to be so not
so much for their sanctioning of emergency medical treatment as
for the procedure that they followed in an emergency situation. Most
of the cases follow standard rules of procedure culminating in a
hearing at which either a guardian is appointed for the purpose of
approving the treatment or the treatment is authorized by a direct
court order, as the statute involved dictates.5 However, two of the
right is by no means clear, and balancing hardships is extremely difficult and
produces no clear-cut conclusion." See, e.g., People ex reL Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d
769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181
A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128,
263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. Ohio 1962);
Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
331 F.2d at 1008.
' See text accompanying notes 34-40 supra.
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952)
(ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2006-07 (Supp. 1963)); State v. Perricone,
37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962) (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-9, 9:6-3 to -4,
9:6-11 (1960)) ; In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933)
(N.Y. CHILDREN'S COURT AcT §§ 1-28); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P.
Ohio 1962) (Onio REv. CODE § 2151.33 (1953)); Mitchell v. Davis, 205
S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (TEx. ANN. Civ. STAT. §§ 2330-37
(1964)).
"' In re Clark, supra note 53 (dictum). The court was, however, acting
by authority of a statute.
" Guardians were appointed in People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411
Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d
751 (1962); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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cases, State v. Perricone8 and In re Clark,5 7 represent a departure
from normal procedure. In Perricone the complaint was oral, and
both the formal pleadings and notice were waived."8 The procedure
followed in Clark strikingly resembles that of Georgetown. In Clark
the court received an oral application for authority to administer
blood transfusions to the three-year-old son of Jehovah's Witnesses,
and the court issued an order authorizing the transfusions before
any service was had upon the parents or a hearing was held. While
the court had extensive statutory authority,"0 it considered such ac-
tion within its "broad equitable jurisdiction" even without the
statute.6 0 The court was not concerned with the fact that the normal
rules of procedure had been circumvented, since
the law provides extraordinary remedies too; e.g., the temporary
restraining order, whereby, for cause shown, the court may act
first and inquire later.
Where a child's well-being, especially his life is concerned, it
would be precisely preposterous to withhold all measures in his
behalf until a time for hearing had been found (or made) in the
court's overflowing calendar; notices had been prepared; citations
had been served; and hearing held-at best a week or two later....
The court had not only the right but the duty to act in the
child's behalf first and give the parents their day in court later.01
The constitutional questions raised by the Georgetown case chal-
lenge Judge Wright's authority to act at all in this situation. But,
assuming his authority to act in some manner, the question of proper
Treatment was administered under direct court order in In re Vasko, 238
App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933); It re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128
(C.P. Ohio 1962). Assuming Judge Wright could get jurisdiction over the
patient under 21 D.C. CODE ANN. § 301 (1961), the broad language of that
statute would seem to permit either procedure.
"37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
"185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. Ohio 1962).
"It is not clear from the report how the pleadings and notice were
waived. However, the parents were represented at the hearing by counsel,
who argued the case on the merits after his motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction was overruled. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751
(1962).
" Upon the certificate of one or more reputable practicing physicians, the
court may summarily provide for emergency medical and surgical treat-
ment which appears to be immediately necessary for any child concerning
whom a complaint or an application for care has been filed, pending the
service of a citation upon its parents, guardian, or custodian.
OHIO IZEV. CODE § 2151.33 (1953). Note that the court in Clark considered
an oral application sufficient to satisfy the statute.
" In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 130 (C.P. Ohio 1962).
11 Id. at 130-31.
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procedure presents the dilemma of whether to preserve the basic con-
cepts of law through orderly process, on the one hand, or to act
decisively while it is still possible, on the other. Some procedure
must be preserved, and perhaps the best way to do that is through
the judge's own thought processes. In a recent federal decision
6 2
concerning failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor, a judge
was reversed not because he had failed to appoint a guardian, but
because he had failed to give the matter careful consideration, so that
his decision was based on inadvertence. Not the decision itself, but
the mode of arriving at it seemed significant to the court. Perhaps
Judge Wright was on the right track when he gave the interested
parties actual notice of his intention to act and when he advised
the patient's husband to obtain counsel. Perhaps he should have
gone further in actually explaining to the parties the legal sig-
nificance of what he might do and their rights with respect to it.
Of course, there is great virtue in the mechanics of service of
process and filing of pleadings, for such devices nurture the Ameri-
can ideal-law over man. But, in an emergency situation, perhaps the
best that can be done is to require the judge to adhere to the rules of
procedure as closely as possible, yet allow discretion to temper them.
DORis R. BRAY
Taxation-Estate Planningm-The Marital Deduction-Formula Be-
quests
The marital deduction was first introduced into the federal
estate tax law in 19481 to eliminate the inequities2 between tax
treatment of estates in common law states and those in community
property states. It allows a deduction of up to fifty per cent of the
adjusted gross estates for the value of any property interest, other
"2 Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958).
"Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117, amending Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 812, 53 Stat. 123 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056).
For a discussion of the history of the marital deduction see, United States
v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963).
2 LOWNDES & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxEs 368-70 (2d ed.
1962).
SINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c) (1). The adjusted gross estate is
derived by subtracting from the gross estate expenses and deductions allowed
under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2053, 2054. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2056(c) (2) (A). It is a concept primarily designed for determining the
marital deduction. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 5 (1948).
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